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U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE; PART III of III: The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation was signed in Washington fifty years ago. Is it a relic of a bygone era, or still a cornerstone of Asian stability? Part III of a new American Enterprise Institute report looks at where the future may take the alliance in a military and strategic sense and whether or not it is really worth preserving.

The half-century celebration of the U.S.-Japan alliance comes at a time of continuing change in Asia, as well as in Japan and the U.S. China's rise to economic, political, and military prominence has significantly changed conditions in Asia since the 1990s.

At the same time, new governments in Tokyo and Washington have pledged dramatic breaks with the recent past and have promised to focus more on domestic issues than foreign ones. With the current global economic crisis and the continuing wars in the Middle East and South Asia, pressures on the alliance to define its role in the coming years have mounted.

The Obama administration's moves to cut advanced weapons systems such as the F-22 and to scale back missile defense plans naturally raise questions about long-term U.S. military capabilities in the Pacific.

LANDSCAPE: The Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) rise to power seems to have fundamentally shifted Japan's political landscape. While U.S. administration turnover between the Democratic and Republican parties is common, the accession of an opposition party to power in Japan for the first time in over fifty years has raised questions as to the future of the alliance under DPJ rule. U.S. observers have been watching Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama closely, listening to his statements about basing Japan's foreign policy on the concept of "fraternity,” or yuai, as well as his call for a new East Asian Community centered on the trilateral relationship of Japan, China, and South Korea.

The U.S. role in Hatoyama's grand strategy is unknown, although he has repeatedly stated that the relationship with America, in other words the alliance, is the "cornerstone" of Japanese security for the foreseeable future.

As of January 2010, however, the new Japanese and U.S. administrations find themselves in a rare, public dispute over fulfilling the 2006 agreement on realigning U.S. forces in Japan. Of particular controversy is the move of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma, in Okinawa, to a new location on the same island at Camp Schwab.

RENEGOTIATION: Hatoyama has repeatedly called for a renegotiation of the agreement, which would also affect the timetable for moving eight thousand U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam, as well as the consolidation and return of other areas on Okinawa used by U.S. forces to Okinawa's government.

Both U.S. and Japanese diplomats have traded sharp words over the fate of the agreement, and a failure to come to an acceptable resolution would certainly cast a pall on U.S.-Japan relations during President Obama's term in office. Already, senior observers on both sides of the Pacific worry that the unresolved disagreement is doing significant damage to long-term political relations.

Yet, if the overall goal of the realignment process is to allow U.S. forces to maintain their presence in Northeast Asia while minimizing the burden placed on the Japanese host areas, then the agreement as a whole should be fulfilled as planned.

VIABILITY: Of greater concern for the long-term viability of the alliance is whether Washington and Tokyo continue to share common political and security goals for maintaining East Asian stability and prosperity. As the North Korean nuclear crisis continues to drag on, both sides retain their focus on missile defense, which now has resulted in several successful interception tests by Japanese Maritime SDF destroyers outfitted with Aegis antimissile systems.

Yet, with Tokyo beginning to reduce its commitment to future missile-defense systems and with no current political movement on negotiations with North Korea (the six-party talks), it is unclear whether Washington and Tokyo share the same vision for dealing with Pyongyang. Further, Japan's demand that the status of its citizens abducted by North Korea be fully resolved has also caused strains within the alliance, since the Bush administration treated such concerns as secondary to the goal of achieving North Korean de-nuclearization.

RESENTMENT: Considering the failure so far to end Pyongyang's nuclear programs, U.S. unwillingness to pressure North Korea on the abductees issue has resulted in subdued, yet real, resentment on the part of some Japanese officials. That said, Japanese support for the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (to stop the export of illicit materials) and UN sanctions against North Korea have allowed the allies to work together to control the maritime domain in Northeast Asia.

Japan and the U.S. share the same strategic conundrum regarding China: how can each country maintain and develop economic relations with China while attempting to hedge against its growing military capabilities?

NAVAL THREAT: The U.S. Navy and the Japanese Maritime SDF are particularly concerned about the power of China's Navy, which now has over 60 submarines and increasing numbers of destroyers, patrol ships, Coast Guard–equivalent vessels, and the like. With China stating that it plans to build several aircraft carriers, alliance military planners are questioning why Beijing is developing power-projection capabilities that could be used to deny access to U.S. naval ships and to control strategic waterways.

Similarly, the growth of the Chinese Air Force's fighter squadrons, including advanced 4.5 generation fighter planes, indicates that the U.S., along with alliance partners like Japan, may not have air superiority in the case of a conflict with China (such as over the Taiwan Strait) in the future.

ROCKET FORCES: This, combined with the expansion of China's strategic rocket forces, complicates the alliance's plans for ensuring peace and stability in Northeast Asia. On top of such strategic changes, the Obama administration's decision to halt America's F-22 Raptor fleet at 187 planes and not to allow export variants of the Raptor also leaves Japanese planners uncertain about whether the U.S. will continue to maintain a credible regional force to protect Japan.

One way to maintain the alliance's importance in coming years is to create some regional trilateral or quadrilateral mechanisms with the U.S.-Japan alliance at the core.

These security-related issues raise important political questions for the future of the alliance.

CONSULTATIONS: Neither Washington nor Tokyo wants to see trade nor political relations with China deteriorate, but both naturally question why Beijing continues to build such powerful military capabilities. When Japanese and U.S. leaders inserted a clause on their interest in peaceful resolution of territorial issues in the Taiwan Straits in their 2005 Security Consultative Committee joint statement, Beijing's negative reaction led them to remove the words in subsequent official statements.

Given the alliance's stated commitment to respond to "situations in areas surrounding Japan," however, concerns over Beijing's unwillingness to work more closely with regional powers on security issues have raised the question of how the alliance can work together to shape Chinese behavior in positive ways for regional stability.

SCALED BACK: Beyond issues of China and North Korea, it appears the grander aspirations of the early Bush-Koizumi years to create a "global U.S.-Japan alliance" have now been scaled back. As evidence of this, observers point to the Hatoyama administration's decision to end the Japanese Maritime SDF's eight-year Indian Oceanrefueling effort in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

It is perhaps more correct; however, to recognize today that each partner in the alliance has global interests that each can work with the other to protect. Tokyo's recent decision to contribute nearly $5 billion toward reconstruction in Afghanistan is a symbol of the Hatoyama administration's attempts to play a leading role in nontraditional security operations.

COMMITMENT: Similarly, the recent Japanese Maritime SDF mission off the coast of Somalia to conduct anti-piracy operations is a good example of Japan rethinking its global security role. Tokyo determined that such a commitment was in Japan's national interests and dispatched two destroyers and two P-3 airborne surveillance planes to protect Japanese shipping. These ships are interacting with the U.S.-led international Combined Task Force 151, providing information and maintaining open sea lanes.

While this is not an alliance operation, Japan's working alongside U.S. naval vessels indicates how political priorities the alliance partners share can be expressed in ad-hoc activities in and outside of the Asia-Pacific region. This may portend a relationship in which Washington cannot take Tokyo's support or participation for granted; instead, both sides will have to work out how best to interact, even over shared concerns, after each has chosen a particular policy.

OBJECTIVES: Still, the various challenges the alliance faces in Asia should occupy the attention of strategists and operations planners and should lead to continued close cooperation and a set of shared strategic objectives. The ballistic-missile threat from North Korea and the steady growth of Chinese missile, maritime, and air forces will only increase in coming decades. These threaten regional stability and can be used to target not just population centers, but also Japanese and U.S. military forces that could be used to deter or defeat such threats.

Thus, continued cooperation on ballistic-missile defense should be of the utmost priority to the alliance. Indeed, missile and air defense, along with anti-submarine warfare, should be expanded to encompass other friendly countries, such as South Korea and Australia, thereby building off of current maritime-cooperation activities.

CREDIBILITY: Ultimately, however, the credibility of the alliance will rest on the combination of military capability and willingness to maintain stability in Asia that each partner possesses. In this regard, then, the Obama administration's moves to cut advanced weapons systems such as the F-22 and to scale back missile-defense plans naturally raise questions about long-term U.S. military capabilities in the Pacific.

Will the Obama administration maintain U.S. force levels in Asia at their current strength? Moreover, what are the Hatoyama administration's defense-spending plans? Japanmust make decisions regarding its fighter-experimental (F-X) fighter program, but will Japan commit to building more surface ships and the surveillance systems needed to maintain its own capabilities?

The Obama and Hatoyama administrations must decide if they view the alliance as a key element in their security strategies or as an outdated relic of a bygone era. In this regard, the alliance must continue to rest on a basis of traditional "hard power." Clearly, the two allies should continue to research, develop, and deploy missile-defense systems on land and sea. Moreover, they must keep up their conventional forces, including advanced fighter aircraft, submarines, surface vessels, and intelligence and surveillance systems.

EXPENSIVE: This is, and will continue to be, expensive, especially in a time of reduced budgets, but the goal of preserving peace requires a formidable military deterrent to any country that may be thinking of employing force to obtain its objectives or to obtain asymmetric advantages that can negate U.S. and Japanese military superiority.

No matter how vigilant and capable the two countries remain, however, peace in the Asia-Pacific region cannot be upheld solely by the U.S. and Japan. A successful system of regional security cooperation requires the efforts of many states. Indeed, one way to maintain the alliance's importance in coming years is to create some regional trilateral or quadrilateral mechanisms with the U.S.-Japan alliance at the core.

Two natural groupings would be Japan-U.S.-South Korea and Japan-U.S.-Australia. These countries already have limited ongoing trilateral discussions and policies, but expanding basic security cooperation, joint exercises, information sharing, and disaster relief, for example, can help build a community of shared interests among liberal allies in the Asia-Pacific region.

OUTREACH: Taking such an approach will also help the alliance work together to engage China. Japan and the U.S. have common economic and political interests with China, and coordinating outreach to China can help set clear benchmarks for progress on many issues, including climate change, confidence building, and trade promotion.

It does not make sense for Tokyo and Washington always to deal with Beijing independently given these common interests, although each country will follow its own policies and national goals when talking with China. Given the concerns both the U.S. and Japan have about China's military buildup or the effects of Chinese industry on pollution, joint efforts to begin dialogues with China or presenting a shared position may be extremely useful.

The alliance has served as the cornerstone of Japanese defense and East Asian stability for fifty years. It has done so because of the willingness of both Japan and the U.S. to bear heavy burdens. Without Japanese support and bases, there would be no credible U.S. military presence in Asia. Without the alliance, there is no assurance that the peace among the major powers in the past fifty years could have continued, nor that they would have been able to develop their economies to the degree they have. For this reason, the alliance should continue and maintain its core focus on defending Japan and maintaining stability in East Asia.

MANAGEMENT: That said the alliance has always required delicate political management by Tokyo and Washington. The two countries have often disagreed on issues of host nation support, SOFA, base location, and joint training. That is natural, and the efforts of thousands of bureaucrats over the past five decades have maintained a positive working relationship. Perhaps the most worrisome trend today is the slow erosion of trust between alliance managers on both sides of the Pacific and a growing sense of frustration with each other.

Today, as East Asia changes dramatically -- with the rise of China, the continuation of economic integration, and the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction -- the Obama and Hatoyama administrations must decide if they view the alliance as a key element in their security strategies or as an outdated relic.

RULE OF LAW: There are great benefits to be had throughout Asia from closer economic integration, but greater dangers if old territorial or historical disputes are not resolved peacefully. If Asia is to continue to be the engine of global economic growth, then Japan's role is indispensable as the leading liberal democratic nation with a civil society based on individual freedom and the rule of law.

In playing both a regional and global role, it is natural for Japan to work with the U.S. to promote the values and policies that have most benefited both countries. The same holds true for Washington, which will continue to be the underwriter of global and regional security for the foreseeable future. The costs and difficulties of maintaining the alliance are far outweighed by the benefits the alliance continues to bring to Japan, the U.S. and Asia as a whole, AEI concludes.